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诚信视角下承包商与发包商的博弈分析

Research on the Game Behaviors between Outsourcer and Contractor in the Perspective of Credit

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【作者】 毛剑梅李先军锁箭

【Author】 MAO Jian-mei~(1,2),LI Xian-jun~2,SUO Jian~2 (1.Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming,Yunnan,650093,China; 2.Yunnan University,Kunming,Yunnan,650091,China)

【机构】 昆明理工大学国土资源学院云南大学工商管理与旅游管理学院

【摘要】 由于缺乏外部监管、交易双方受短期利益驱动以及信息不完全等原因,发包商和承包商的博弈结果表现为双方的不诚信而双方受损。不诚信阻碍了企业的合作,阻碍了我国外包业的发展,进而不利于我国企业提升其核心竞争力。而要解决不诚信所导致企业不合作的问题,从短期来看,应该加强对失信行为的惩罚;从长期来看,应该提高企业管理者的战略经营意识、建立完善的诚信评价与使用系统以及实现企业间的双向锁定等。

【Abstract】 Because of absence of regulation,the short-term interest-driven and imperfect information,the game result is that both the outsourcer and contractor are discredit,which decreased the level of cooperation between the dealers and then obstructed the development of Chinese outsourcing industry and finally worsened the enterprises’ core competence.In order to solve these problems,we should obey the two steps.In short term it is necessary to enforce the punishment to the discredit behaviors.In the long run,improving the operators’ strategy intention, building the consummate credit evaluating & using system,and strengthening the cooperation with partners are indispensible.

【关键词】 诚信外包博弈
【Key words】 creditoutsourcinggame theory
  • 【文献出处】 经济管理 ,Economic Management Journal , 编辑部邮箱 ,2010年03期
  • 【分类号】F272;F224.32
  • 【被引频次】3
  • 【下载频次】290
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