【摘要】 引入广义质量的生产函数,把竞标企业所有关于质量的信息转化为综合性质量指标,求解了多维信息招投标中的最优机制,并证明了3阶段的第1分值拍卖和第2分值拍卖都能够有效实施该最优机制.在此基础上得到多维信息招投标中更具一般意义的收入等值原理:无论买者在事前是否承诺遵循某一评分规则,也无论实施的是第1分值拍卖还是第2分值拍卖,买者的期望收益都相等.进一步分析还表明,买者事前承诺遵循某一合适的评分规则有利于提高整体社会福利,否则会导致竞标企业的过度质量供给,这从整个社会来讲是非效率的.更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper converts all the bidders’ quality information into a comprehensive quality index by employing the production function of generalized quality.Under this fundamental setting,we have solved the optimal mechanism for multidimensional auctions.Moreover,the results show that three stage first-score and second-score auction can both implement this optimal mechanism efficiently.Based on this,we obtain the generalized revenue equivalence theorem in multidimensional auctions: whether the buyer commits to any scoring rule ex ante or not,or whether the first-score or second-score auction is implemented,the expected revenue of the buyer is equal.Further analysis shows that,if the buyer can commit to an appropriate scoring rule,the total social welfare can be improved;otherwise,it will cause bidders’ excessive quality supply which is inefficient from the perspective of total social welfare.更多还原