【摘要】 在正常产品市场上,引入产品异质性、研发溢出、企业吸收能力等影响企业创新的关键参数,利用非合作博弈中常用的逆推归纳法,考察研发结局确定下成本降低性工艺创新企业的讨价还价能力对许可机制的选择以及许可得益大小的影响;在此模型设定条件下,以在位创新企业为视角,将两部制许可与固定费许可、产量提成许可进行比较。研究结论表明,在位创新企业的得益在固定费许可下随着其讨价还价能力的增强而增大,而在产量提成许可和两部制许可机制下,其得益不受讨价还价能力的影响,但其讨价还价能力却有助于许可机制的选择;无论实际创新程度和产品异质性如何,最优的许可机制始终是两部制许可,且与不许可相比,进行两部制许可总是最优的;在位创新企业对创新程度的高估、监督成本的过大和不完全的讨价还价能力可能是现实中其他许可机制并存的原因。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper incorporates such key factors which play roles in innovation as product heterogeneity,R&D spillover and enterprise absorptive capacity.By means of backward induction in uncooperative game,we examined impacts of cost-reducing process innovator′s bargaining power on alternatives of licensing mechanism and licensing gains under the deterministic R&D in normal-product market.In the same model setup,we compared two-part tariff with fixed-fee licensing and output royalty licensing from the standpoint of incumbent innovator.Results and conclusions show that incumbent innovator′s payoff becomes larger with its bargaining power in fixed-fee licensing,which nevertheless has no effect on the payoff in output royalty licensing and two-part tariff.But its bargaining power contributes to find out the optimal licensing mechanism.Moreover,regardless of the actual degree of innovation and product heterogeneity,the optimal licensing mechanism is always the two-part tariff which is also the best licensing mechanism compared with no licensing.In addition,the overestimation of incumbent innovator on the degree of innovation,in combination with high supervision costs and incomplete bargaining power,may be the reason for the coexistence of other licensing mechanisms.更多还原