【摘要】 依据食品供应链中企业与农户间的交易特性,在不完全契约理论框架下,建立了双方承诺不再进行协商的短期合作交易契约设计理论模型。研究结论表明,企业的试验代理人地位是保证农户在第一阶段诚实宣告其类型,从而保证双方专用性投资为最优水平的关键,子博弈精炼纳什均衡的主要限制为,企业支付函数必须为单调函数条件才不会说谎。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the transaction characteristics between the meatpacking enterprise and farmer in the food supply chain and the incomplete contract theory,the paper constitutes the short-term cooperate transaction contraction model with the hypothesis that the both parties promise not to renegotiate.The conclusions show that the status of enterprises as test-agents is crucial to ensure the farmer to declare his type honestly in order to guarantee the special investment of both the parties optimized,and the limitation of the sub-game refined Nash equilibrium is that the payment function of enterprise must be a monotonous one so that the enterprise can tell the truth.更多还原