【摘要】 在建筑工程领域,施工过程中的信息不对称使工程承包商为追求自身利益而与业主处于非合作的状态,只有合理有效的激励机制才能使承包商与业主建立合作关系,共同促进项目的成功。利用委托-代理理论,把施工成本与工期同时作为激励因子,以业主的期望效用为目标函数,建立业主对承包商在信息不对称情况下的激励模型,求解出均衡状态下的激励系数,并分析影响成本与工期激励系数的因素及其影响趋势,为业主设计合理有效的激励合同提供了依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the field of construction,asymmetry information in the construction process leads contractors to seek self-interests so that they are non-cooperative with owners,nothing but reasonable and effective incentive mechanism for owners and contractors will secure a partnership between them and jointly promote the success of the project.This paper builts an incentive model between owners and contractors, treating the construction cost and period as incentive factors, owners’ expected utility as the objective function by applying principal-agent theory under information asymmetry,and then,two incentive coefficients in equilibrium were calculated.At last,the factors affecting the incentive coefficients of construction cost and period and their influencing trends were obtained,which provides a basis for owners to design an effective incentive contract.更多还原