【摘要】 资产剥离作为一种重要的补救措施被反垄断当局广泛运用于横向兼并控制,然而对资产剥离有效性的理论研究却相对薄弱并充满争议,尤其是对资产剥离有效性的适用条件缺乏系统的理论分析。文章基于古诺模型对消费者福利审查标准下资产剥离的合意性进行了分析,得出如下结论:(1)在对称情形下,向竞争对手剥离任意数量大于零的资产均是合意的,而向潜在进入者剥离资产却会导致价格上涨,除非兼并可以产生资产组合效应扩大兼并实体的产能。(2)在不对称情形下,如果企业间的区别仅仅在于资产拥有量的不同,那么向潜在进入者剥离资产是不合意的;而如果企业的区别在于掌握的技术不同,那么向潜在进入者剥离资产似乎是一个相对占优的选择,除非潜在进入者的技术落后于市场上的在位者,没有能力进入市场成为一个活跃的竞争者。因此,资产剥离的有效性在很大程度上取决于能否寻找到合适的受让人。更多还原

【Abstract】 Although asset divestiture has been widely applied in horizontal mergers as an effective remedy,its effectiveness,especially the applicable conditions,lacks enough support of theoretical studies.Based on Cournot model,this paper analyzes the desirability of asset divestiture under consumer welfare standards,and arrives at the conclusions that:a)under symmetric conditions,any asset divestiture to competitors other than potential entrants is suitable unless the merger entity can recombine assets to improve their joint productive capabilities;b)as for asymmetric cases,while the only difference among firms is asset quantity,asset divestiture to potential entrants is not desirable,and while the only difference among firms is technology,asset divestiture to potential entrants seems to be a relatively dominant strategy,unless the technology of potential entrants lags behind the incumbents and can not become an active competitor.Therefore,an important corollary of these findings is that the effectiveness of asset divestiture depends on whether a suitable assignee could be found to a great extent.更多还原