【摘要】 针对我国城镇建设用地增长过快的现状,从财政分权、政府博弈和土地制度3个方面对我国城镇建设用地增长的政府因素进行了分析。结果表明,由于中央和地方政府财税分权,加上以GDP为主的政绩考核制度,促使地方政府具有经济利益最大化的趋利行为,而我国的土地产权、土地征用制度和土地出让制度又让地方政府的趋利行为得以实现;提出我国城镇建设用地增长的政府力量主要来自地方政府。更多还原

【Abstract】 Focusing on urban construction land expansion,governmental influence on expansion of urban construction land in China is analyzed from fiscal decentralization,government game and land system.Due to fiscal decentralization and coupled with GDP-based performance evaluation system,local government seeks to maximizing economic profits.Whereas,land systems such as land ownership,land requisition and land transfer system,let the local governments’profit seeking behavior can be achieved.The conclusion is that the government’force on urban construction land expansion is mainly from local government.更多还原