【摘要】 将近年来博弈论中出现的一种新的研究方法——超模博弈理论应用于Bertrand寡头博弈中,对于具有一般成本函数的差异产品的Bertrand寡头博弈,当企业的策略只是选择价格水平时,比较了博弈为超模和对数超模博弈的充分条件,表明虽然一个对数超模博弈一定是拟超模的,因而较超模博弈的适用范围更广泛,但二者的充分条件之间不具备可比性,即不能由其中一个推出另外一个。同时既使该博弈既不是超模的也不是对数超模的,仍可能存在对利润函数的其它单调转换使博弈成为超模的。当边际生产成本为常数时,给出了具体的反例。当企业的策略为同时选择价格和广告水平,且企业的边际生产成本为常数时,表明在一般的假设下博弈为超模博弈,从而说明了为什么通常情况下较高的广告水平对应着较高的价格。更多还原

【Abstract】 A new analysis method in game theory,supermodular game,is used in Bertrand model,for differentiated-product Bertrand oligopoly with general cost functions,when the strategy variable is price alone,the sufficient conditions are compared for supermodular and log-supermodular game.Although a log-supermodular game is a quasi-supermodular one,which is more general than a supermodular one,the corresponding sufficient conditions placed on the firms’ profit functions are shown not to be comparable,that is one can’t get one from another.When the game is neither a log-supermodular nor a supermodular one,a new monotone transformations of the firms’ profit functions may make the game a supermodular one.For the special case of constant marginal production cost,counterexamples are provided.When the strategy variables are pricing and advertising effort,under usual assumptions and constant marginal production cost,the game is a supermodular one and this explains why higher prices are always associated with higher advertising levels.更多还原