【摘要】 合作博弈论中的Aumann-Shapley值方法可公平地将安全成本分摊给联盟中的每个成员。但该文发现,当出现被动越限约束时,由于Aumann-Shapley值的积分初值设置得不合理,导致了分摊结果不合理。为此,提出一种修正Aumann-Shapley值积分初值的方法,并对其合理性进行论述。该方法保证了Aumann-Shapley值求取公式中沿主对角线积分的要求,使安全成本可合理地分摊给各个用户和发电商,以及使用阻塞线路的双边交易。同时,该文使用基于安全域的节点电价表达式,其中计及了输电线路热稳定约束、系统的静态电压稳定约束和暂态稳定约束,使安全成本的分摊能综合考虑电力系统中主要的安全约束。最后利用NewEngland10机39节点系统展示该方法。更多还原

【Abstract】 Aumann-Shapley value method of cooperative game theory can allocate security cost to each member in the union fairly. When there are passive over-limit constraints, the paper finds that the allocation is unfair due to the irrational integral initial value of Aumann-Shapley value. In order to solve this problem, the paper presents a method of modifying the integral initial value of Aumann-Shapley value and discusses its rationality. This method ensures the integral request along the main diagonal of Aumann-Shapley value formula, and realizes the reasonable sharing of the security cost between consumers and power suppliers and between the bilateral transactions of using the congested line. At the same time, the paper uses the spot price expression based on security region, which takes the consideration of transmission line thermal stability constraint and static voltage stability constraint and transient stability constraint simultaneously, thus the main security constraints of power system can be considered comprehensively in the security cost allocation. At last, the method is demonstrated in the New England 10- genetator 39-bus system.更多还原