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采油厂和油藏管理区的委托代理关系
Principle-agent relationship between oil production plant and reservoir management district
【摘要】 油藏管理的改革与发展需要设计合理有效的激励机制,新的油藏组织体制的建立需要研究新的组织管理模式下有关主体的相互关系与利益冲突。针对该问题,分析了油藏管理涉及的相关主体及其相互关系,讨论了油藏管理区与其上级采油厂的行为特征及其相互影响,提出建立采油厂和油藏管理区的委托代理关系,重点研究了两者的产出分配问题。通过建立油藏管理区与采油厂产出效益分配完全信息动态的Stackelberg博弈模型及相应的实例分析,得出了采油厂的最优收益分配比例和油藏管理区最优产量的均衡结果,并分析了影响双方均衡结果的因素。
【Abstract】 Reform and development of reservoir management need reasonable and effective inspire mechanism. A study of the relationship and interest conflict of main stakeholders in organization management is needed in the new reservoir organization structure. Here,main stakeholders of reservoir management and their relationship are analyzed. Reservoir management district is mainly researched and the output distribution of reservoir management district with oil production plant and other reservoir management districts is analyzed. The Stackelberg game model of reservoir management district and oil production plant is constructed,and then,the optimal distribution proportion of oil production plant and the optimal output of reservoir management district are computed,and the influential factors of the result are analyzed.
【Key words】 reservoir management; principle-agent relationship; oil production plant; incentive mechanism design; Stackelberg game;
- 【文献出处】 油气地质与采收率 ,Petroleum Geology and Recovery Efficiency , 编辑部邮箱 ,2009年05期
- 【分类号】F426.22
- 【下载频次】47