【摘要】 为研究企业并购过程中所广泛使用的"对赌协议"经济学本质及其影响,基于合同经济学与机制设计理论,以激励理论为核心,建立了投资方进行"对赌条款"设计的决策分析框架。探讨并对比了完全信息、不完全信息以及存在有限责任制等情形下"对赌协议"的Pareto有效性及其最优激励方案。结果表明:当企业管理层的风险偏好是中性的时候,"对赌协议"是一种能够有效保护投资者收益和激励管理层的最优制度安排。这一分析框架很好地解释了现实案例中所涉及的投融资双方的行为以及收益分配结果。更多还原

【Abstract】 For making clear what is the contract known as"valuation adjustment mechanism(VAM,for short)"which has been widely employed by all kinds of investment activities even in acquirement&mergence of firms,the principal decision-making framework for the items of VAM was built on the basis of contract theory and mechanism design theory,focusing on incentive theory.Pareto effective and optimal incentive scheme of VAM were explored under different environment such as complete information,incomplete information and limited obligation.The resuh shows that VAM is a kind of optimal institute arrangement for insuring returns of investor and stimulating managers effectively. This kind of framework can explain the behavior of both investors and financing parts well in practice.更多还原