【摘要】 围绕代理人逆向选择导致委托人无法直接识别代理人类型状态,研究真实状态下委托人契约实施惟一性问题。分析讨论了完全信息下委托人的最优契约和逆向选择下的次优契约,建立了信号空间上的纳什均衡与有效配置的映射关系,并推广到逆向选择问题中的类型空间,将委托人契约与代理人状态联系起来,最后研究分析委托人契约纳什实施惟一性问题。研究表明,委托人提供的完全信息下最优契约不具备纳什实施惟一性,而满足代理人激励相容约束的次优契约具备纳什实施的惟一性,并为合理、有效的激励契约设计提供了检验途径。更多还原

【Abstract】 The Nash equilibrium implementing uniqueness of contract with nonverifiable agent types is researched in the true state.The first-best contract with complete information and the second-best contract with incomplete information are discussed based on a comprehensive review of the related literature.Based on Nash equilibrium in the signals space,the contract and the agent type is connected,then the uniqueness of Nash implementation on the first-best contract and the second-best contract is studied.As a result,the second-best contract can be Nash implemented uniquely in nonverifiable agent types,but the first-best contract cannot be done,which is offered as a test method for efficient incentive contract design.更多还原