【摘要】 本文以地方官员是"理性经济人"作为分析的出发点,将现有政治晋升机制中的"相对绩效考核"方式体现于官员的效用函数,从而考察了晋升博弈中的地方官员之所以存在行为差别的原因,为理解中国区域经济差异提供了一个并非仅仅基于经济因素的解释。分析得出以下结论:第一,在现有的晋升机制下,发达地区地方官员会(较不发达地区地方官员而言)更多地对地区经济增长伸出"援助之手",这从区域经济发展的角度来看,容易引发官员出现不良行为,进而导致区域经济"发散"的恶性循环;第二,中央政府旨在推进区域经济平衡发展的政策有利于官员行为的"趋同",但中央政府反腐力度的加大,却有可能加剧官员行为的"发散";第三,在晋升博弈中,随着市场一体化进程的推进,区域经济的相互融合将有利于官员行为的"趋同"。在利用理论模型进行上述推理之后,本文最后通过构建一系列统计指标,对影响中国地方官员行为差别的主要因素进行了实证分析。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the fundamental homo economicus hypothesis,this paper constitutes Chinese local government officials’ utility function by considering the relative performance evaluation system existed in China’s political promotion mechanism and explains why officials in different regions may display different behaviors.After doing these,the paper gives a new explanation of China’s regional economic disparities through the angle of officials’ be-havior and makes the following conclusions:(1)Local government officials in rich regions may have more incentives to give ‘helping hand’ to local economic development than those in poor regions,this may increase disparities of regional economy;(2)Regional balanced development policies provided by the central government may have convergent effect on local officials’ behavior but the anti-corruption policies may have divergence effect;(3)Market integration may decrease disparities of local officials’ behaviors.At the end of the paper,we make empirical analysis of main factors influencing official behavior.更多还原