【摘要】 金融反腐败的机制设计应该从金融监管政策入手,因为在金融监管及执法过程中存在着监管腐败问题。在金融监管执法活动中,构建具有腐败倾向特征的监管执法者对金融机构或其从业人员的违法行为监督执法的这样一个模型:在实施具有恰当的惩罚激励措施的自认制度时,一个福利最大化的政府可以防范监管者和被监管者之间合谋腐败的发生,可以通过降低官僚作风、保持较少的监督执法官员、降低监管寻租以增加社会福利,为弱化或消除金融腐败带来良好的治理效应。更多还原

【Abstract】 The mechanism design of financial anti-corruption shall focus on financial regulation because there is corruption in financial supervision and enforcement of law.This paper proposes a model of financial regulation and law enforcement to supervise the illegal acts and behaviors of financial institutions and workers.With some appropriate incentive measures,a government maximizing the welfare can use self-confession mechanism to prevent the collusion between financial supervisors and the workers under supervision.It can reduce bureaucratic style,lower the supervision rent-seeking acts so as to increase social welfare,bring about satisfactory governance effects for weakening or eliminating financial corruption.更多还原