【摘要】 技术市场逆向选择损害优质技术的利益。"有代价承诺"信号机制指出技术卖方可以在发送良品信号的同时伴随发送一个承诺信号,以此提高劣品冒充良品的成本,从而保证良品信号的成功传递,有效分离市场。信号博弈模型和算例论证了这种承诺信号机制的有效性,并且证实在其他交易方式不能确保信任,或可能要牺牲更多良品利润才能产生分离均衡时,设定一个伴随良品信号的承诺信号即可。更多还原

【Abstract】 Adverse selection damaged the value of excellent technology.The signal mechanism of "priced promise" proposed in this paper meant that the providers of technologies sent an accompanying "promise-signal" along with the "good technology" signal.This promise increased the cost of imitation for low quality technologies,and insured the successful transfer of "good technology" signal.So that it separated the market and avoided adverse selection.The "signal game" model and the numerical result approved the validity of this signal mechanism,and showed that when high quality technologies had to sacrificed more probable profit to ensure the trust each other in other trade methods,and then to separate market,the signal mechanism of "priced promise" can do it exactly.更多还原