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一维周期链结构中混合单向模仿少数者博弈模型研究

Research of mixed single directional imitational minority game in one dimensional periodic chain

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【作者】 谭勇杨伟松全宏俊

【Author】 TAN Yong1,YANG Wei-song2,QUAN Hong-jun1(1.Department of Physics, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China;2.Communication and Electronic College, Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University, Nanchang 330013, China)

【机构】 华南理工大学物理系江西科技师范学院通信与电子学院

【摘要】 根据现实生活中普遍存在的经纪人跟风现象,提出并研究了一维周期链结构中混合单向模仿少数者博弈模型.在该模型中,将经纪人置于一维周期链结构中,一部分经纪人可以模仿其左侧邻居的行为,采取相应的决定;另一部分经纪人维持基本少数者博弈的规则进行决策.研究发现,当记忆容量m较小时,系统表现比原始的少数者博弈模型要好.随着可参与模仿的经纪人人数N0的增加,系统方差呈下降趋势,体现出引入模仿的有效性.当m增大时,随着N0的增加,系统方差呈现一定的上升趋势,体现出引入模仿对经纪人预测能力的抑制作用.

【Abstract】 A mixed single directional imitational minority game is proposed according to the phenomenon that agents can imitate in real life. Agents are put in one dimensional periodic chain, some agents can imitate their left-hand neighbor to make decisions and others just make choices based on their own strategies. Results show that system performance is better than that without imitation, and system variance decreases with increasing imitational agent number N0 for small memory size m, which exhibits the validity of imitation. System variance increases with increasing N0 for large m, which indicates the inhibition to forecast ability for agents.

  • 【文献出处】 纺织高校基础科学学报 ,Basic Sciences Journal of Textile Universities , 编辑部邮箱 ,2009年01期
  • 【分类号】O225
  • 【被引频次】1
  • 【下载频次】58
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