【摘要】 在发电侧竞价上网的情况下,供电公司通过实行可中断电价可以适当规避购网电价剧烈波动的风险。但我国发电企业并未实施竞价上网,供电公司购网电价由政府制定,相对比较稳定,故实行可中断负荷管理对供电公司缺乏一定的激励机制。本文首先根据估算的用户缺电损失确定可中断电价;随之提出用户可中断电价响应系数的概念,对已确定的可中断电价进行调整;然后根据经济学中供需理论,将可中断电价与峰谷分时电价相结合,在分析供电公司成本和效益基础上,建立联合优化模型,采用分解算法进行求解。算例分析表明,该模型既能使供电公司与用户的利益不受损害,又可解决当前可中断电价缺少激励机制的问题,非常适合我国当前的电价改革模式。更多还原

【Abstract】 Power-supplying companies can properly evade the risk resulted from on-grid price fluctuating acutely by actualizing interruptible price,base on biding on the generating side.But our country has not actualized biding and on-grid price has been comparatively stable,so it is lacking of incentive mechanism for power-supplying companies to actualize interruptible price.Firstly,the paper confirms interruptible price according to estimated customer interruption cost.Secondly,it presents the conception of the response coefficient for customer interruptible price and adjusts the confirmed interruptible price.Thirdly,according to the supply-demand theory in economics,the paper integrates the interruptible price with peak-valley time-of-use power price in DSM measures,then constructs united optimal model based on analyzing the cost and benefit of power-supplying companies.The model is solved with decomposed arithmetic.Finally,the simulation analysis of the fact sample shows that the proposed model can not only make power-supply companies and customers nondecreasing,but also solve the problem to the lack of incentive mechanism for actualizing interruptible price.Therefore,the price-united optimal design is fit to electricity reformation mode at present in our country.更多还原