【摘要】 在分析农业发展银行公司治理特殊性的基础上,通过建立一个多任务委托代理模型,研究农发行委托代理关系,结果表明:国家作为农业政策性银行的所有者时,不可避免地给其赋予了多重任务;对农业政策性银行制定利润方面的激励和考核机制,促使银行改善经营管理;国家对农业政策性银行的激励一定程度上影响其贷款质量。在此基础上,提出了完善农业发展银行公司治理政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the comprehensive analysis of the particularity of the corporate governance of the Agricultural Development Bank of China,this paper,setting up a multi-task principal agent model,clarifies the facts that,as the owner, the state inevitably endows its banks with multiple tasks,and that proper profit incentive and evaluation mechanisms established in the agricultural policy bank can significantly improve its management,and that what incentive policies the state implements in the agricultural policy bank would,to a certain extend,affects the quality of its loan.Based on the above,the paper also makes recommendations,in terms of policy,how to put forward a sound corporate governance in Agricultural Development Bank of China.更多还原