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政府投资期权监管中最优激励与审核机制构建
The Construction of Optimal Incentive and Audit Mechanism for Government Supervision over Real Investment Option
【摘要】 针对投资期权执行中的逆向选择问题,文章提供了一个以最优契约为基础的审核机制。该机制由于加入了内生惩罚约束而更加符合实际。文章重点分析审核机制对投资期权执行效率的影响以及对激励机制的替代作用。这种替代作用表现为投资执行效率方面的完全替代和信息租金方面的部分替代。由于审核机制具有一定的期权特征,致使最优审核机制具有一定的复杂性,因而采用数值模拟的方法进行比较静态分析。最后,以政府实施项目监管和审核机制为背景,提供了一个以股票价格为信号的投资期权审核机制的应用,为政府构建有效的项目投资监管机制提供政策建议。
【Abstract】 Aiming at the adverse selection issue in the application of investment option,the paper provides an audit mechanism based on the optimal contract,which is more practical due to the introduction of endogenous punishment. It puts great emphasis on the effect of the audit mechanism on both the efficiency of the application of investment option and its substitution effect on the incentive mechanism. The substitution effect involves two aspects:the complete substitution in the investment efficiency and the partial substitution in information rents. The optimal audit mechanism is complex because of the option feature of the audit mechanism. The paper makes a comparative static analysis based on the numerical simulation method. Finally,it provides an audit mechanism of investment option on the basis of stock-price signals and raises some suggestion about the construction of effective supervision over program investment.
【Key words】 investment option; incentive and audit mechanism; supervision over investment;
- 【文献出处】 财经研究 ,Journal of Finance and Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2009年10期
- 【分类号】F283;F224
- 【被引频次】3
- 【下载频次】226