【摘要】 研究目的:探究中国耕地减少的深层原因,寻求耕地保护的治本之策。研究方法:委托—代理理论。研究结果:中国耕地保护存在深刻的体制障碍,主要表现在3个方面:(1)代理人的激励机制不足;(2)监督成本过高;(3)代理人其他工作对耕地保护工作有负面影响。研究结论:中国耕地保护可以从建立有效的激励机制、降低代理成本、增加代理人风险和减少耕地保护的机会成本等方面进行体制创新。更多还原

【Abstract】 The purpose of this study is to explore deep-seated reasons of rapid loss of cultivated land and to seek a permanent cure of cultivated land protection in China.The principal-agent theory was employed.The results indicate that there are three aspects in the system obstruction in protecting the cultivated land :(1) The agent lacks incentive mechanism;(2) The supervision cost is too high;(3) Other tasks of the agent have negative effect on cultivated land protection.The conclusions of the research are that Chinese cultivated land protection system can be innovated in the following ways: setting up efficient incentive mechanism,reducing agent cost,adding agent’s risk and decreasing opportunity cost of cultivated land protection.更多还原