【摘要】 在供应链质量管理中,购买商与供应商之间的质量博弈是多阶段、动态的不完全信息重复博弈。在对长期质量契约关系中"质量商誉"的作用分析基础上,对长期质量契约存续的条件进行了探讨。长期质量契约是否存在与购买商认为供应商是诚信供应商的先验概率有关。如果购买商确定至少向供应商购买一次产品,购买商给予供应商的支付价格越高,不诚信供应商越容易珍惜自己提供高质量产品的声誉,向购买商提供高质量的产品。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the supply chain quality management,the quality game of the manufacturer and the supplier is a repeated game of incomplete information which is multi-stages and evolving.Based on the functional analysis of the "quality good will" in the long-term quality contractual relationship,the discussion is conducted on the conditions whereupon a long-term quality contract exists.Whether a long term quality contract exists is related to the prior beliefs that the supplier is deemed as an honest one by the manufacturer.If a purchaser shall procure product from a suppler for at least once,the higher the price to be paid by the manufacturer to the supplier,the more likely that an dishonest supplier will cherish its good will of providing high-quality product and thus provide high-quality product to the purchaser.更多还原