【摘要】 在由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链系统上,零售商掌握关于其期初库存水平的私有信息.在非对称信息下,供应商可以选择提供单一合同参数,或菜单式合同参数.研究得出,首先,在非对称信息下,若供应商提供单一合同类型,那么,当且仅当供应商谈判权利大于零售商时,供应商才有动机提供单一回购合同;若供应商提供菜单式合同类型,则供应商通过提供菜单式回购合同,总是能够同时改善供应商和零售商的各自收益.其次,若系统为分散控制,则,在非对称信息下,若零售商的期初库存水平小于某水平,则供应商选择菜单式批发价格合同,反之亦然.最后,若系统为回购控制,则在非对称信息下,供应商总愿意提供菜单式回购合同.更多还原

【Abstract】 A supply chain comprised of one supplier and one retailer is analyzed.The retailer holds private information of its prior inventory level,which is unknown to the supplier.Under asymmetrical information the supplier can choose to provide a unique contract parameter or contract menus.The following results are gotten. Firstly under asymmetrical information,when the supplier provides a unique contract,the supplier has incentive to provide unique buyback contract if and only if the supplier’s bargaining is larger than the retailer’s;when the supplier provides contract menus,the supplier can always provide buyback contracts menus to improve the profits of the supplier and the retailer.Secondly,the supplier always chooses wholesale contracts menu if the retailer’s prior inventory level is smaller than a certainty threshold in the decentralized system;Vice versa.Lastly,the supplier always provides buyback contract menu under asymmetrical information in the buyback contracts system.更多还原