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国有建筑业企业经理期权激励问题探讨

Discussion on the Incentive Problems of Executive Option in State-owned Construction Enterprises

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【作者】 张建军; 倪江波;

【Author】 ZHANG Jianjun , NI Jiangbo

【机构】 重庆大学建设管理与房地产学院; 建设部信息中心 重庆400045; 北京100835;

【摘要】 采用企业经理期权理论,针对阻碍国有建筑业企业建立现代企业制度的企业经营者长期激励问题,提出在国有建筑业企业经营者中推行股票期权计划是调节经营者和所有者之间的利益差距,激励经营者采取有利于企业所有者利益的长效行为的有效途径;但还需要股票市场、公司法人治理结构等内外因素的有效配合。

【Abstract】 For the long-term incentive problems of enterprise operators who prevent the state-owned construction enterprises from setting up the modern enterprise system, this paper uses executive option theory to propose that stock option plan implemented among the enterprise operators is an effective way. It can change the difference between the operators and owners and encourage operators to make long-term actions that are benefit to the owners. However, it also needs the effective cooperation of internal and external factors such as stock market and corporate governance structure and so on.

  • 【文献出处】 建筑经济 ,Construction Economy , 编辑部邮箱 ,2008年03期
  • 【分类号】F272;F426.92
  • 【被引频次】3
  • 【下载频次】85
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