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国有控股上市公司控制权转移对经营绩效和代理成本的影响

Influence of Takeover on Managerial Performance and Agency Cost of State Holding Targets

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【作者】 曾昭灶李善民

【Author】 Zeng Zhaozao1,Li Shanmin2(1.School of Management,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou 510420,China;2.School of Business,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China)

【机构】 广东外语外贸大学国际工商管理学院中山大学管理学院 广州510420广州510275

【摘要】 本文对2000—2004年我国发生控制权转移的国有控股上市公司在控制权转移前后的经营绩效、代理成本进行了实证检验。结果表明:控制权转移后,公司的代理成本水平下降,经营绩效得到提高;卖方为地方的子样本代理成本的下降和经营绩效的改善大于卖方为中央企业的子样本;买方为民营的子样本的代理成本的下降和经营绩效的改善大于买方为国有的子样本;买方为国有的控制权转移经营绩效提高和代理成本下降主要来自最终控制人变更子样本。

【Abstract】 This paper empirically investigates the performance and agency cost of state holding takeover targets in Chinese listed companies during 2000 to 2004.The results show that managerial performance is improved and agency cost decreases on the whole after post corporate control transfer. Managerial performance improvement and agency cost decrease of targets sold by local government are larger than those of targets sold by central state owned enterprises.Managerial performance improvement and agency cost decrease of targets purchased by private owners are larger than those of targets purchased by state owned entities.Managerial performance improvement and agency cost decrease of targets purchased by state owned entities mainly come from the sub-sample of ultimate control changed.

【基金】 国家自然科学基金项目(70572054)
  • 【文献出处】 技术经济 ,Technology Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2008年05期
  • 【分类号】F272
  • 【被引频次】54
  • 【下载频次】698
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