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行政垄断、放松规制与产业绩效——基于原油开采业的实证分析

Administration Monopoly, Deregulation and Industry Performance: A Positive Analysis Based on Crude Oil Exploration Industry

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【作者】 张耀辉蔡晓珊

【Author】 ZHANG Yao-hui,CAI Xiao-shan (Jinan University,Guangdong Guangzhou 510632)

【机构】 暨南大学产业经济研究院暨南大学产业经济研究院 广东广州510632广东广州510632

【摘要】 我国原油开采业是行政垄断而不是自然垄断,而行政垄断下原油开采业的市场绩效表明了其危害性。通过对我国原油开采业1998年的隐性放松规制进行界定,建立计量模型对这次放松规制的效果进行了实证分析,从理论和实践两方面证实了放松规制有利于我国原油开采业产业绩效的提升。

【Abstract】 To rectify the understanding mistake of the character of crude oil exploration industry of some domestic scholars, this paper distinguishes between natural monopoly and administration monopoly, pointing out that the character of China’s crude oil exploration industry is administration monopoly and demonstrating its harm to the market performance of crude oil exploration industry in China. The author first defines the recessive deregulation of the crude oil industry of China in 1998, then takes a positive test on the deregulation effectiveness using a econometric model, and confirms that deregulation improves China’s crude oil exploration industry in theory and practice.. Finally, based on the analysis of this paper, the author puts forward some policy measures..

【基金】 国家自然科学基金项目(0573041)
  • 【文献出处】 当代财经 ,Contemporary Finance & Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2008年02期
  • 【分类号】F426.22
  • 【被引频次】22
  • 【下载频次】881
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