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双重委托下大股东激励、壁垒效应实证分析
Empirical Study on Incentive and Barrier Effects of Substantial Shareholder under Dual Principal-agent
【摘要】 本文通过对中国沪深两市A股上市公司的大样本研究,阐述了由于股权集中所产生的双重委托代理关系对上市公司绩效产生的各种影响。实证分析发现,公司价值的确随着大股东所有权与控制权的差距缩小而上升。在结合上市公司股权结构特征分析后发现,竞争的股权结构也同样能够为公司价值带来积极影响,通过代理权的竞争能够遏制大股东利用控制权进行掠夺,从而为公司价值带来积极影响。
【Abstract】 This paper studies the effects of the dual principal-agent relation on the corporate performance of listed companies at Shanghai & Shenzhen A-share stock market in China. The following significant conclusions emerge from our empirical analysis. Corporate value increases with decreasing gap between substantial shareholder’s ownership and control rights. Competing ownership structure also has positive effects on corporate value after analyzing the characteristics of ownership structure of listed companies. The competition of agent right can help to restrict substantial shareholder from misusing his/her controlling status, and therefore brings about positive effects on corporatev alue.
- 【文献出处】 证券市场导报 ,Securities Market Herald , 编辑部邮箱 ,2007年12期
- 【分类号】F832.51
- 【被引频次】2
- 【下载频次】312