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非对称信息下产险公司与投保大户之间的二周期讨价还价博弈
Two-staged Bargaining between Property Insurer and Big Insured with Asymmetric Information
【摘要】 将投保人分为投保大户与非大户,认为投保大户能够准确预知自身损失概率,而产险公司却无法知道投保大户损失概率的真值。在这样的信息不对称条件下,构造了产险公司与投保大户之间的二周期讨价还价模型。用博弈论求解该模型,得到了完美贝叶斯均衡解,进而给出了产险公司在谈判中能获得的最大期望收益与投保大户的最优策略。
【Abstract】 We define big insured in a way that can foresee the exact lost probability of its own,which is unknown to property insurer.As a result of this,it makes information asymmetric.This paper constructs a two-staged bargaining model between property insurer and big insured with asymmetric information,uses the game theory to solve the model and gains the perfect Bayes equilibrium,and eventually finds the property insurer’s maximum expected income and the big insured’s optimal strategies respectively.
【关键词】 非对称信息;
财产保险公司;
投保大户;
完美贝叶斯均衡;
【Key words】 asymmetric information; property insurer; big insured; perfect Bayes equilibrium;
【Key words】 asymmetric information; property insurer; big insured; perfect Bayes equilibrium;
- 【文献出处】 管理工程学报 ,Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management , 编辑部邮箱 ,2007年04期
- 【分类号】F840.3;F224
- 【被引频次】6
- 【下载频次】292