【摘要】 本文从公司内部治理角度对我国上市公司关联交易进行研究后发现,股权结构对关联交易行为有很大影响;我国独立董事制度的建立,在一定程度上有效约束和减少了关联交易;董事长与总经理两职合一更促进了关联交易行为的发生;监事对关联交易行为的监督机制还没有充分发挥;管理层没有通过频繁的关联交易来提升公司业绩,债权人还未能积极参与到公司治理中,也就不可能有效抑制非公允关联交易行为的发生。更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis has carried out analysis on related-party transactions in Chinese listed company from inside governance. The research results show: Share equity structure influences related-party transactions strongly; Independent directorate system can effectively restrain and reduce the emergence; chairman and general manager are two duty-in-one, the related-party transactions easily happen; and the supervision mechanism of supervisor board has certain effect ,but its effect is not notable ;at the same time, Managers don’t improve corporate performance by related-party transactions; the creditors in our country can not participate in corporate governing actively, debts constraint mechanism did not give full play on the related-party transactions. So, we should perfect inside governing mechanism and standardize related transactions.更多还原