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道德判断与伦理学的非形而上学化

Moral Judgment and the Non-metaphysical Trend of Ethics

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【作者】 曾志

【Author】 ZENG Zhi(Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing 100871)

【机构】 北京大学哲学系 北京 100871

【摘要】 20世纪伦理学起始于摩尔直觉主义对自然主义的批判。自然主义坚持道德判断可以还原为事实判断,直觉主义则声称"善"不可定义。情感主义反过来把道德判断看作主要是一种情感判断,力图从价值方面而不是经验方面来理解道德判断的性质问题。非认知主义进一步发展了情感主义的命令性语句样武,并由此揭示出造成传统伦理学谬误的根源。

【Abstract】 Ethics of the 20th century originates from the critique to Naturalism by Intuitionism of G. E. Moore. Naturalism insists that moral judgment can be returned to fact judgment. However, Intuitionism claims that it is impossible to give "good" a definition. On the contrary, Emotivism mainly takes moral judgment for emotional one. And they try to understand the nature of the problem on moral judgment from the view of value instead of experience. Non-cognitivism proceeds to develop the pattern of directive sentences of Emotivism, and as a consequence, to subtly reveal the root that traditionally ethics was mistaken.

【关键词】 伦理学道德判断非形而上学化
【Key words】 ethicsmoral judgmentnon-metaphysical trend
  • 【文献出处】 中国人民大学学报 ,Journal of Renmin University of China , 编辑部邮箱 ,2005年01期
  • 【分类号】B82-06
  • 【被引频次】5
  • 【下载频次】501
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