【摘要】 运用不完全信息动态博弈的理论,建立了一个防范道德风险的博弈模型,给出了该博弈的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,在此基础上给出了基于最优博弈策略的契约的具体形式。而这种基于博弈论的契约可以克服有成本的状态验证模型(CSV)及经典激励理论中承诺的可信性问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on incomplete information dynamic game theory, this paper constructs a game model against moral hazard. Then it studies the perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game, and gives the contract’s expression. The model presented here is proved to overcome the problem of credibility in costly state verification(CSV) model and some related research in the theory of incentive.更多还原