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西部大开发中环境保护的博弈分析与法律制度创新——一种法律经济学观点
A Gaming Analyse and Law Creation of Environmentin West-in-develop——A Law Economic Viewpoint
【摘要】 本文利用博弈论分析了居民、厂商和政府在环境保护中的实际行为决策,各类博弈最后得到的解具有一个共性,不利于环境保护的纳什均衡,即形成非合作博弈。结论指出,必须在法律制度上进行创新并结合市场机制改变博弈一方的收益,使博弈达到新的内在均衡,提高西部环境保护的效率。
【Abstract】 This article analyses the process of behavioral decision made by the citizens, firms and gov- ernment in the environment protection with gam ing theory, It points out that all the games share a com- mon feature, it s the Nash equilibrium that is harm ful to environment protection to form a no-cooperative game. The result shows that in order to achieve a new equilibrium to increase the west environment pro- tection efficiency, it should change each player s profit accord ing to the marketmechanism and legal insti- tution innovation.
【关键词】 环境保护;
博弈论;
纳什均衡;
法律制度创新;
【Key words】 environment protection; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; legal institution innovation;
【Key words】 environment protection; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; legal institution innovation;
【基金】 广西壮族自治区哲学社会科学规划研究资助课题研究成果(04FFX005)。
- 【文献出处】 兰州商学院学报 ,Journal of Lanzhou Commercial College , 编辑部邮箱 ,2005年04期
- 【分类号】F224.32
- 【被引频次】9
- 【下载频次】211