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基于竞合博弈的参与人行为特性研究

Study on the characteristics of the Participants’ Behavior in Co-Opetition Game

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【作者】 周勇王其藩

【Author】 Zhou YongWang Qifan(School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200430)

【机构】 同济大学经济与管理学院同济大学经济与管理学院 上海200430上海200430

【摘要】 当今市场博弈参与人的行为已由过去纯粹的竞争型行为转变为竞合型行为,博弈的类型也由个体之间的博弈推展到群体之间的博弈。均衡悖论的实质是个体理性与集体理性的背离,在"过程理性"的推证下,完全理性人的前提假定应该被有限理性人所替代。规则的改变是现实演进的内在要求,参与人特征与博弈境域的影响应被反映在博弈规则的创新改进中。在竞合博弈的关系框架中,企业、用户、敏感竞合人、非随身策略人和替代竞争人有着各具特色的行为个性,但竞合的共性却会导致帕雷托改进。

【Abstract】 The participants’ behavior in the present the market game has been changed to that of the co-opetition from that of pure competition, and the game between individuals has also been changed to that among groups. The substance of the equilibrium paradox is that the individual rational deviates from the collective rational. Under the inference of the "process rational", the presupposition of the complete rational man is to be replaced by that of the limited rational man. The changes of the rules is the result of the inherent demands by reality evolution, and the participants’ characteristics and the game circumstances are to be reflected in the innovations of the game rules. And within the framework of co-opetition, the enterprise, its users, its sensitive co-opetition rivals, non-sensitive competition individuals and its competition substitutes will respectively bear their own specific characteristic individuality, thus leading to their Pareto improvement.

  • 【文献出处】 山东师范大学学报(人文社会科学版) ,Journal of Shandong Normal University(Social Science Edition) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2005年01期
  • 【分类号】F224.32
  • 【被引频次】14
  • 【下载频次】420
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