【摘要】 本文基于一个两时点大股东掠夺模型,考察了股权结构、代理成本与外部审计需求之间的关系。我们的模型分析结果表明,第一大股东持股比例与企业价值成U型曲线关系,而与外部审计需求成倒U型曲线关系。即:代理成本较高的上市公司更有可能聘请高质量的外部审计师,以降低代理成本,提高公司市场价值。我们以中国A股上市公司2001和2002年的数据,对上述结论进行了实证检验并得到支持,本文分析还表明,债务融资与外部审计在降低代理成本方面具有相互替代性。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on a two-stage large shareholder exploitation model,we examine the relationship among ownership structure,agency cost and external auditing demand.We show that the ownership of large shareholder demonstrates a U-shaped with firm’s value,but a reverse U-shaped relation with external auditing demand,i.e.,the more severe a firm’s principle-agent problem is(the lower its value is),the more likely the firm would hire a high quality external auditor.We test our theory with the sample data from Chinese A share listed companies.Our theory is supported by empirical analysis.We further use 2-stage OLS regression,find that listed companies can increase their value by hiring high quality external auditor.This implies that external auditing may provide a solution to the principal-agent problem in China’s listed companies.In addition,we find that debt financing may reduce external auditing demand by reducing agency cost,which implies that debt may be a substitute for external auditing in agency cost reduction.更多还原