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从博弈论角度看国有企业改制中国有资产流失问题

The Analysis of State- owned Enterprises’ Asset Loss From The Viewpoint of Game Theory

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【作者】 曾庆彪谌贻庆

【Author】 Zeng Qingbiao; Chen Yiqing (Economics and Management school of Nanchang university, Nanchang 330029, China)

【机构】 南昌大学经管学院南昌大学经管学院 南昌330029南昌330029

【摘要】 国有企业改制,是一种从根本上提高企业竞争力、增强企业活力、改善企业经济效益的有效途径。但是在改制中,经常会出现国有资产流失这样一个严重问题。本文从博弈论的角度来分析这个问题,在国有企业改制为民营企业的过程中,实质上是企业经营管理者和主管政府官员进行博弈,其结果是由其博弈而达到的纳什均衡来决定的。在其博弈中存在两个纳什均衡,即(合谋,合谋)和(不合谋,不合谋)两个纳什均衡。而国有资产流失正是由(合谋,合谋)的纳什均衡结果决定的。同时也指出了国有资产流失和有限次重复博弈或一次性博弈有很大关系。并在此分析基础上,提出了一些防止国有资产流失的对策以及政策性建议。

【Abstract】 The reform of state-owned enterprises system is a basic way to improve the competitive ability and activeness of the enterprises, and can win more profit for business. But during the process of system reforming, the problem of state- owned enterprises’ asset loss was brought out at the same time. The article from the viewpoint of game theory to analyze this problem, and at last we draw an conclusion: The process of state- owned enterprises transferred to private business, which is a game between the enterprise man- agers and the officers of government essentially; the outcome is decided by the NASH equilibrium of this game. And base on the analysis, we put some suggestions on how to solve the problem of state- owned enterprises’ asset loss.

【关键词】 博弈国有企业改制
【Key words】 gamestate-owned enterprisesthe reform of system
  • 【分类号】F224.32
  • 【被引频次】5
  • 【下载频次】141
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