【摘要】 以我国上市公司中25家管理层收购企业为样本,就我国管理层收购与上市公司治理绩效的相关性进行了实证分析,建立了数学模型。研究结果显示,这25家管理层收购企业中公司绩效与管理层持股呈非线性的三次方程关系,即当管理层持股比例在0~7.50%的范围内,随着管理层持股比例的增加会提高上市公司经营绩效;当管理层持股比例在7.50%~33.35%之间时,管理层持股比例的增加会导致管理层对外部股东的利益侵占,增加公司的代理成本,从而表现为上市公司经营绩效与管理层持股比例负相关;而在管理层持股比例大于33.35%的情况下,持股比例的增加又会刺激管理者的经营行为,进一步提高上市公司的整体绩效。这一结果证明我国上市公司中实施管理层收购的企业管理层持股与公司绩效呈非单一性关系,对于我国有效地开展上市公司治理、合理地实施管理层收购具有借鉴和指导意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 25 listed companies of management buyouts in China are described as samples by using econometrics method. This paper made an empirical research of correlation between management buyouts and corporate performance in China, set up a mathematics model. The results showed that their ROE and DIR is expressed as a nonlinear cubic equation in 25 listed companies of management buyouts in China. If managerial stockholding level is less than 7.50%, it will be positively related to corporate performance. If it is between 7.50 and 33.35%, managerial stockholding level will be negatively related to corporate performance. If it is over 33.35%, managerial stockholding level will intensively be interrelated to corporation governance performance as a positive relationship. The study results will be beneficial to effectively carrying out listed companies governance and rationally implementing management buyouts in China.更多还原