【摘要】 针对寻租治理过程中存在的信息不对称性,建立了政府稽查部门和利益集团之间的三个不完全信息动态模型,给出了各自的子博弈精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡。结果表明,单纯的对寻租行为进行处罚或对稽查行为进行奖励,并不能有效的减少寻租现象,而只有在处罚寻租行为的同时,对不同稽查行动进行普遍的激励,才能改善治理的效果,有效防止寻租行为。更多还原

【Abstract】 In accordance with the information unsymmetry during disposal of rent-seeking,we establish three incomplete(information) dynamic models involving government inspection departments and groups for profits,and then give their(sub-game) refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium respectively.The result shows that it can’t effectively reduce the rent-seeking phenomina only by punishing of rent behavior or awarding of inspection behavior,while only by means of general encouraging to different inspection behavior during punishment of rent-seeking behavior,can improve disposal effect and effectively prevent rent-seeking behavior.更多还原