【摘要】 研发活动中的道德风险问题是造成合作研发绩效不佳的一个潜在原因.通过构建虚拟研发组织成员间的博弈模型,对其研发激励的非合作决策Nash均衡解、合作决策帕雷托最优解和社会福利最优解进行比较,指出由于虚拟研发组织知识共享过程中的学习效应的存在,一定条件下虚拟研发组织能够有效自激励,并给出了其有效自激励的参数区域.更多还原

【Abstract】 Moral hazard is a potential cause of the poor performance of cooperative R&D. A game among the members of a virtual R&D organization is built and its no-cooperative Nash equilibriums, cooperative Pareto equilibriums and society welfare maximizing solutions are compared. It shows that R&D incentives of no-cooperative Nash equilibriums is not less than that of cooperative Pareto equilibriums in a large range of parameters because of the learning effect existing in the process of knowledge sharing. The virtual R&D organization is somehow self-incentive and define the effective self-incentive parameter region.更多还原