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信息不对称条件下的存款保险制度
On deposit insurance system under condition of information asymmetry
【摘要】 信息不对称现象广泛存在于经济生活中,它是指合约双方由于所处地位的不同使得彼此对信息的了解存在差异,而道德风险与逆向选择则是其必然产生的一对结果。存款保险制度自创立以来,一直与信息不对称相伴,道德风险与逆向选择使得该制度的作用在各国受到了广泛质疑。
【Abstract】 Asymmetric information, which is defined that there are differences in knowledge of information for each parties of contract, exists in economic activities extensively. Furthermore, moral hazard and adverse selection are a pair of inevitable outcomes of asymmetric information. Since the deposit insurance system was established in western countries, it had always been disturbed by asymmetric-information. And the deposit insurance system is doubted by the authorities in many countries because of moral hazard and adverse selection.
【关键词】 信息不对称;
道德风险;
逆向选择;
存款保险制度;
【Key words】 asymmetric information; moral hazard; adverse selection; deposit insurance system;
【Key words】 asymmetric information; moral hazard; adverse selection; deposit insurance system;
- 【文献出处】 重庆工商大学学报.西部论坛 , 编辑部邮箱 ,2005年02期
- 【分类号】F832.1
- 【被引频次】2
- 【下载频次】130