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统一价格竞价机制下发电商报价策略研究
Research on Generating Entities’ Bidding Strategies in Uniform Price Auction Rule
【摘要】 在统一价格竞价机制下,考虑到电力需求弹性,建立了完全信息静态博弈模型,求解得到了发电商的最优报价策略.通过分析,指出了发电商报价行为的特点以及统一价格竞争机制所存的缺陷,证明了该机制不是成功的竞价机制.
【Abstract】 Based on the demand elasticity of electricity, this paper presents a game model with complete information under the uniform price auction rule and acquires the optimal bidding strategy of the generating entities. The characteristic of the bidding strategy and the defect of this rule are pointed out. It is proved that the uniform price auction rule is not good.
【关键词】 电力市场;
报价;
博弈;
统一价格竞价机制;
【Key words】 electricity market; bidding; game; uniform price auction rule;
【Key words】 electricity market; bidding; game; uniform price auction rule;
【基金】 辽宁省科技厅项目(2002401017)
- 【文献出处】 系统工程理论与实践 ,Systems Engineering-theory & Practice , 编辑部邮箱 ,2004年04期
- 【分类号】F407.6
- 【被引频次】19
- 【下载频次】284