节点文献

非对称需求信息条件下的供应链信息共享机制

Supply chain information sharing mechanism under the condition of asymmetric demand information

  • 推荐 CAJ下载
  • PDF下载
  • 不支持迅雷等下载工具,请取消加速工具后下载。

【作者】 唐宏祥何建敏刘春林

【Author】 TANG Hong-xiang~(1,3), HE Jian-min~1, LIU Chun-lin~2 (1.School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210018 China; 2.Business School of Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China; 3.School of Management, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou 310018, China)

【机构】 东南大学经济管理学院南京大学商学院 江苏南京210018中国计量学院管理学院浙江杭州310018江苏南京210018江苏南京210093

【摘要】 缺乏有效的信息共享是供应链运作效率低下的主要原因之一,而信息不对称问题广泛存在于供应链之中.面临低市场需求的零售商有可能夸大真实的市场需求以获得更多的产品供应.运用信号传递博弈理论研究了供应链中零售商和供应商之间的共享需求信息的机制,得出了零售商可以通过采购价格向供应商传递真实的市场需求信息的条件,结果表明供应商和零售商之间的信息共享的关键在于分离均衡的存在,分离均衡使得供应商能够得到足够的信息量借以识别零售商的市场预测的真实性.

【Abstract】 Without effective sharing of information is one of the main reason that the supply chain operates inefficiently . The information asymmetry problem exists in the supply chain extensively. The retailer facing low market demand has an incentive to inflate his forecast to get more supply. Using the signaling game theory, we investigated the demand information sharing mechanism between retailer and supplier, get the condition under which the retailer could communicate true market demand information to supplier. The result indicates that the key for retailer to share information with supplier is the existence of separating equilibrium, the separating equilibrium let supplier get enough information to identify the credibility of the demand forecast of retailer.

【基金】 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70101003).
  • 【文献出处】 系统工程学报 ,Journal of Systems Engineering , 编辑部邮箱 ,2004年06期
  • 【分类号】F274
  • 【被引频次】119
  • 【下载频次】1792
节点文献中: 

本文链接的文献网络图示:

本文的引文网络