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投标人失信行为的经济分析
Economic analysis on breaking promise of bidder in project bid invitation and bidding
【摘要】 用博弈论的方法分析纯战略和混合战略两种情况下投标人失信的经济根源 ,分析认为 ,不管在什么情况下 ,只要没有激励和有效的监督约束 ,投标人肯定会弄虚作假甚至舞弊 .最后本文提出了避免失信行为产生的建议措施
【Abstract】 The pure and mixed strategies of breaking his promise of bidder with Game Theory is analyzed. So long as there is no incentive mechanism and efficient monitoring constraint, bidders will be certain to break his promise or fraud under any cases. Finally, this paper suggests some measures against breaking promise of bidders.
【关键词】 招投标;
不完全信息;
静态博弈;
战略均衡;
建议措施;
【Key words】 tendering; uncompleted information; static game; pure strategies; mixed strategies; measures;
【Key words】 tendering; uncompleted information; static game; pure strategies; mixed strategies; measures;
- 【文献出处】 武汉化工学院学报 ,Journal of Wuhan Institute of Chemical Technology , 编辑部邮箱 ,2004年02期
- 【分类号】F284
- 【被引频次】16
- 【下载频次】102