【摘要】 虚拟企业的高效运作是盟主企业和伙伴企业共同倾注努力的结果.由于虚拟企业特殊的信息结构特征,导致盟主企业和伙伴企业之间存在严重的委托-代理问题.其中,双边激励是一个主要的道德风险问题,而控制权结构的安排有助于激励两者为虚拟企业倾注努力.据此,建立了虚拟企业控制权与双边激励问题的关系模型,从解决激励盟主企业、伙伴企业为虚拟企业做出努力的双边激励问题出发,确定最优的虚拟企业控制权结构.更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the marketable opportunity, virtual enterprise(VE) is organized by some individual and competitive companies via contracts. Both the core company and the cooperation company are very important to the success of VE. However, there are serious principal-agency problems in the development of VE due to the particular information structure. Double-side problem is the main moral problem. The control power structure is a way to deal with this problem. This article structured a model between the control power structure and the double-side problem in order to design an optimal control power structure on the basis of equilibrium between the effort’s benefit and the cost.更多还原