【摘要】 运用演化博弈模型分析了我国农村群体性突发事件产生的原因 ,给出了不同条件下农村强势群体和弱势群体博弈的演化稳定策略 (ESS) .结果表明 ,如何限制、约束博弈双方采取不同策略的收益是决定其采取何种博弈策略的关键 ,并据此提出了避免突发性事件产生的对策和建议更多还原

【Abstract】 The Countryside, agriculture, farmers” problem is now the focus of the whole society, in this paper, we analyze the causes of unexpected mass incidents in countryside by use of evolutionary game model, and obtain the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) for rural strong population and weak population under different circumstances. It is the conclusion that the key to the adoption of different game strategy lies in how to limit both play sides to adopt different strategic profits, on this basis, proposals are raised as well on how to prevent the unexpected mass incidents.更多还原