【摘要】 为了解决供需链中下游实体的成本是私有信息的情况下,上游供应商的回购决策问题,运用委托-代理模型研究了供应商的最优回购策略,得到了供应商的最优决策方案.与对称信息的情况相比,信息结构的非对称导致下游实体的订货量低于系统的最优订货量,使得供需链无法达到协调,供需链的总利润和供应商的利润降低,零售商的利润增加.在非对称信息下,供应商提供的契约菜单值随着下游实体成本的增加而增大.更多还原

【Abstract】 The problem of designing an optimal buy back contract to maximize the supplier′s profits in a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain is solved. When the marginal cost of the retailer is private information, principal-agent models are used to derive the supplier′s optimal buy back policy. It is shown that it is no longer possible to let the retailer′s order quantity achieve the solution when the supplier has complete information. And the supply chain coordination is not obtained. In this case, the total profits and the supplier′s profits are lowered while those of the buyer are improved. The value of supplier′s contracts menu augments as the increase of the marginal cost of the retailer.更多还原