【摘要】 对于需要进行专用性资产投资或通过契约安排形成专用性资产投资的经销关系中,往往会存在双边道德风险:一是生产商敲竹杠的道德风险;二是经销商隐蔽行为的道德风险。本文通过一个简单的不完全契约安排试图解决这种双边道德风险,以取得社会最优投资,促使交易的完整进行。更多还原

【Abstract】 When it needs specific investments or specific investments formed by contract arrangement, there are often double-side moral hazards in distribution relationship. One is holdup moral hazard of manufacturer; the other is hidden action of distributor. In this paper, we try to solve this double-side moral hazard by a simple incomplete contract, and achieve optimal investment of society, ensure that the transaction can be accomplished.更多还原