【摘要】 本文用国有企业软预算约束和国有商业银行软预算约束形成的双重软预算约束分析框架系统分析了国有商业银行不良贷款的内生性。通过对国有企业沉没成本的维持成本、国有商业银行复活投机和地方政府利用双重软预算约束而形成的国有商业银行"公地悲剧"的分析,揭示了中国国有商业银行不良贷款形成和积累的动态机制,指出了逐步硬化商业银行软预算约束预期对从根本上解决国有商业银行不良贷款问题的决定性意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper probes into the mechanism and institutional arrangement that are crucial for the formation and the dynamic accumulation of NPLs of SOB by using the analytical framework of dual soft budget constraints( SBC), which is the SBC of state - owned - enterprises(SOEs)and that of state - owned - banks(SOBs) . By analyzing the sunk costs initially caused by SBC of SOEs, the speculation for resurrection instigated by the SBC of SOBs, and the tragedy of commons of SOBs caused by local governments seeking to free - ride the SBC of SOBs, the paper reveals the endogenous nature of the NFL problem of the SOBs and stresses the importance of hardening dual SBC, especially that of SOBs for banking reform in China.更多还原