【摘要】 在概述西方金融理论中债务融资的公司治理功能文献之后,本文主要探讨预算软约束下的杠杆治理是否有效这一学术问题。选用我国上市公司为样本,本文发现随着银行贷款规模的增大,经理层的公款消费和自由现金流增大,企业效率和公司价值下降;然而,董事会成员替换频率没有显著关系。在我国,债务融资非但没有提升公司治理,反而扩大了经理的代理成本。这一反常的金融现象来源于预算软约束,并且引致了我国的银行坏账问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper examines the role of debt governance under soft budget constraints. Using a sample of modern firms listed on China’s burgeoning stock market, we find that in contrast to standard finance theories, debt facilitates managerial exploitation of corporate wealth in an emerging market. An increase in bank loans increases the size of managerial perks and free cash flow. Meanwhile, the size of bank loans has a negative relationship with corporate value. The failure of debt governance is attributable to the institutional setting of China, where the government owns large banks and firms.更多还原