【摘要】 运用期权博弈理论分析得出了各种信息条件下企业并购决策临界点模型。在不考虑竞争对手的条件下 ,企业的并购决策临界点取决于并购者和被并购者之间的期权博弈 ,即并购价值增加和成本增加之间的权衡 ;在考虑竞争对手的条件下 ,企业的并购决策临界点取决于并购企业与被并购企业之间、并购者之间的期权博弈 ,即价值增加、成本增加和风险率 ( hazard rate)三者间的权衡。最后通过仿真实验对以上各种分析结果进行了验证更多还原

【Abstract】 Option games were used to get the trigger level of acquisition with different information. In a market without competitors, the trigger level for the acquisition company depended on the tradeoff between the acquisition companies and the target ones balancing the value increasing and the cost increasing. Considering competitors, the trigger level for the acquisition company depended not only on the tradeoff between the acquisition company and the target company, but also on the tradeoff between the acquisition company and the competitors,balancing the value increasing, the cost increasing and the hazard rate. The above results were verified through the emulation experiment of acquisition strategies with different information.更多还原