【摘要】 为克服在信息不对称条件下的风险资本家和企业家之间的“委托—代理”关系所产生的代理人的机会主义行为、道德风险等问题,在交易设计中通过不同金融工具的选择来影响企业的资本结构及剩余索取权的分割,实现激励机制与约束机制的有机结合,达到降低代理成本的目的。更多还原

【Abstract】 Under the condition of information asymmetric, in order to overcome the opportunistic performance and moral hazard resulted from the “principal-agent”between the venture investment capitalists and entrepreneurs, it is wise to select various financial tools to decide the division of entrepreneurs capital structure and residual claim, the combination of motivational and restricted mechanism, so as to lower the agent cost.更多还原