【摘要】 在区域电力市场中,购买方面临着金融风险。购买方风险取决于多种因素,而发电方市场力是其中最重要的因素之一,因此如何评估发电方市场力是购买方风险管理的关键。与以往假设发电机边际成本不同的情况下建立价格竞争博弈模型来分析发电方市场力不同,文中将在所有发电机边际成本相同的假设下研究价格竞争博弈模型,从而得到更为简洁、明了的数学证明和均衡点刻画。由模型得到的必须运行率(MRR)指标计算简单、经济学意义明确,可作为近一步分析市场力作用或存在的扫描工具,文中最后利用浙江省电力市场的真实数据分析了 MRR指标的特点。更多还原

【Abstract】 In a regional power market, the financial risk faced by power retailers is depended on many factors. How to assesssupplier market power impact is essential for power retailer risk management. A price competition game for modelingoligopolistic competition in a single-period electricity market auction has been formulated in our recent work, in which anassumption was made that generator marginal costs were un-identical. In this paper, the single-period auction games are furtherstudied with the assumption that generator marginal costs are identical. It is concluded that the later assumption facilitates asharper result, which states that the market clearing price at equilibrium under tight capacity constraint is unique. Thisassumption also permits us to obtain simpler equilibrium characterization and mathematical proofs. As an application, anumerical must run ratio (MRR) index is derived that can be used to screen supplier market power as well as to develop optimalbidding strategies under certain market conditions. The analyses based on real data illustrate the characters and effectiveness ofthe index.更多还原